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36. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY
Our editors have invited me to prepare a lead
article for discussion in the next issue of the ILT
on ''Humanitarian Intervention and the Non-
Intervention Principle in International Law." I
. welcome disagreements, comments and
suggestions about my views on this
controversial and very important topic.
Finally, it is already time to look ahead to
the ASIL Annual Meeting next April. Our group
will sponsor a lunch panel on ''The
Philosophical Foundation of Public International
Law", which will be chaired by our editor, Tim
Sellers. Our business meeting will also be held
immediately before or after the panel. Ideas and
suggestions of items for inclusion in our meeting
agenda will be greatly appreciated (I can be
reached at jshen@sjulawfac.stjohns.edu). Please
keep· an eye on ASIL newsletters and
announcements in the mail and/or on the web.




WHAT USE Is JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF
JUSTICE To PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW?
For the past thirty years lawyers and
philosophers have from time to time wondered
how to apply John Rawls' Theory ofJustice to
international relations. Now John Rawls has
tried to do so himself, making the question even
more pressing for those of us who care about
international law. Rawls' own effort, and its
deficiencies, make clear that it would be a bad
idea to apply the ideas of his Theory ofJustice to
international relations. International lawyers
and statesmen should leave Rawls' books on the
shelffor philosophers.
Since the Theory of Justice first came out
with its rather short remarks about international
relations, people have speculated about their
possible application to international law. Now
Rawls has worked out a Law ofPeoples, widely
published in various forms, most recently in his
collected essays (1999). Rawls' Law ofPeoples
Volume 6(2)
reveals how incompletely thought out his
international theory really is. His essay is
deeply troubling. First, simply because Rawls
has not thought his theory out fully, but second
because anyone who does try to work through
the implications of Rawls' theory for him will
quickly see fundamental problems. The
improbable assumptions that Rawls makes are
so obvious to persons with a background in
international law that any educated person
would be better off going directly to the legal
issues at hand, without Rawls help.
Rawls' theory of international justice, as set
out in his essay on the Law of Peoples begins
with a very brief list of seven basic "principles
ofjustice between free and democratic peoples,"
which includes:
1. Peoples as organized by their governments
are free and independent and their freedom
and independence is to be respected by other
peoples.
2. Peoples are equal and parties to their own
agreements.
3. Peoples have the right of self-defense, but
no right to war.
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-
intervention.
5. Peoples are to observe treaties and
undertakings.
6. Peoples are to observe certain specified
restrictions on the conduct ofwar.
7. Peoples are to honor human rights.
This is obviously a very bare-bones sketch
of his position, and Rawls admits that his
statement of principles is very incomplete.
Other principles would need to be added, (he
admits) and would require much explanation and
interpretation. For instance, there would need to
be principles for forming and regulating
federations or associations of peoples and formal
standards of fairness for trade and other
cooperative arrangements. There should be
certain provisions for mutual assistance between
peoples in times of famine and drought, and
provisions for insuring that in all reasonably
developed liberal societies the citizens' basic
needs will be met. This is all that Rawls says
about the obviously extraordinarily important
issue of international economic and social
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inequity. His principles are tossed off so lightly
that one can hardly discern where they came
from. Rawls' principles are mostly rather nice
principles. They appeal to the better side of
human nature. But he never fully explains what
they are, or where they come from. Rawls
appears to believe that the mere attractiveness of
his conclusions will motivate us to adopt his
theory. Why should it? Other theories could
generate the same principles. Rawls'
conclusions cannot justify his premises. They're
simply conclusions that are attractive in their
own right.
In the end, the essence of what Rawls finds
important about his theory lies not in his seven
meager principles or in the scant elaboration that
he gives them. What really interests Rawls, in
the bulk of his essay is not these particular
conclusions but rather his methodology.
Methodology was also the focus of Rawls'
Theory of Justice. So it should come as no
surprise that questions of methodology are what
largely concern Rawls when he comes to apply
his ideas to the international setting, so much so
that one can disregard his conclusions. The
seven conclusions with their small amount of
elaboration are beside the point. What really
matters for Rawls is his methodology. Applying
Rawls to international legal theory means
embracing his methodology, for better or worse.
Rawls' methodology is distinctive, striking and
in the end (when examined) unacceptable to
anyone with any knowledge of international law.
The methodology that Rawls uses has two
basic parts to it. They are closely linked but
theoretically distinct: First, Rawls bases his
theory on the principles of domestic justice,
beginning with his Theory of Justice. Rawls
looks first to issues of domestic justice before
"extending" (as he puts it) these same theories to
the international situation. This has important
consequences and creates important problems.
Domestic justice comes first.
The second distinctive aspect of Rawls'
methodology is that when he finally does extend
his theory to international relations he takes it
for granted almost without examination that the
morally relevant entities in the international
Volume 6(2)
arena are states. International lawyers and
theoreticians will recognize this at once to be an
enormously problematic assumption.
Rawls' theory begins with the case of a
hypothetically closed and self-sufficient liberal
democratic society concerned only with political
values and not with any other part of life. This
gives him a theory of domestic justice. The
question now arises as to how that conception
can be extended in a convincing way to cover a
given society's relations with other societies, to
yield a reasonable law of peoples. Just as, in
1971, Rawls published a Theory ofJustice and
only thirty years later returned to apply this
theory of domestic political justice to the
international arena, so his theory itself
progresses from domestic to international
affairs. This makes the progression from
domestic to international principles of justice
seem natural, but it is fur from the only way to
address the two issues and in fact raises some
questions that Rawls never answers.
Rawls' second assumption is pervasively
statist. Despite one belated reference to
humanitarian intervention, Rawls never
questions the primary role of states. Rawls
simply assumes that the enterprise at hand
concerns interactions between societies or states
or (to use his term) "peoples". When Rawls
writes of "peoples" he usually means states or
state-like entities, and the relationships between
them. Rawls is trying to develop the ideals and
principles that a society should employ to guide
its policy towards other states or "peoples".
Many scholars over the years have noticed
this statist outlook in Rawls. Not only are his
conclusions statist, but so is his whole
methodology, to such an extent that it would
have been a surprise if Rawls had reached
anything but statist conclusions. Rawls'
problem grows out of the progression of his
writing. Since he already had an answer in place
concerning domestic political justice, it would
not have made sense to start again from the
beginning in addressing international affairs. So
naturally he looked to states (not individuals) as
the building blocks of his new international
order.
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Rawls' two methodological assumptions are
both profoundly flawed, so much so that they
vitiate his entire enterprise. In developing his
"constructivist" (i.e. contractarian) theory,
Rawls begins with the basic structure of a closed
and self-contained democratic society, which he
then extends forward to future generations,
outward to encompass foreign peoples, and
inward to cover special social situations. Each
time the constructivist procedure is modified to
fit the subject in question. In due course all the
main principles are on hand, including those
needed for the various political duties and
obligations of individuals and associations.
At times Rawls' seems conscious of his
shaky foundations. He concedes that "at first
sight" his contructivist doctrine seems
hopelessly unsystematic. Why proceed through
the series of cases in one order rather than
another? Rawls' asks himself the right question,
but gives no satisfactory answer. He prefers to
select one particular sequence, and to test its
merits as he proceeds. There is no advance
guarantee that this choice makes sense, and
Rawls admits that much trial and error may be
needed. That is the best that Rawls can do to
justify his methodology. Rawls prefers instead
to apply his methodology without justification
and then to see what happens, through a process
of trial and error. But he never goes back to test
his hypothesis against its results, or revisit his
ordering of domestic and international politics.
The matter is simply dropped. Rawls knows that
this is a very important question that he is
avoiding, but he has nothing to say about it and
so he simply moves on.
The same thing happens with Rawls'
persistent assumption of statist premises. Rawls
must be sensitive to the question of statism,
because so many of the principles that he
chooses have significant statist aspects to them,
and Rawls has been widely criticized for this.
He is surely aware that his decision to base "his
contractarian analysis on the preferences of
states is deeply controversial. Rawls recognizes
the problem, without offering any satisfactory
response. Having worked out ')ustice as
fairness" for domestic society, he moves on as if
Volume 6(2)
the same structures will apply in other contexts.
Rawls transposes his familiar domestic methods
to construct a "law of peoples" and justifies this
by observing that peoples as corporate bodies
organized by their governments already exist in
some form all over the world. These existing
entities must agree to any proposed political
reforms. This being the case (Rawls believes)
all principles and standards proposed for the law
of peoples must be acceptable to the considered
and reflective opinion of "peoples" and their
governments.
There is some truth to this. International
lawyers must realize the importance of being
hardheaded and practical. Law begins with
reality, and reality includes states, whether one
likes them or not. So it is entirely reasonable for
those who advocate practical reforms to start out
with statist assumptions, as Rawls does. Even
profoundly anti-statist reformers may have to
begin with the recognition that states are to a
greater or lesser degree simply a fact of life.
This makes sense for lawyers, who must deal
with the world as they find it.
Philosophers, however, should dig more
deeply. The value of philosophy lies in stepping
outside existing institutions, to evaluate and
improve them. Rawls does not do this, making
assumptions that any international lawyer would
recognize at once as profoundly problematic.
For example, Rawls makes the assumption
that domestic political structures have priority.
Rawls wants to build domestic societies first and
then extrapolate a law of peoples to govern their
interactions. This two-tiered methodology does
not offer any decisive advantages, and a very
good argument could be made that Rawls has
the priority precisely backwards. The
constructivist school of international relations
theory (to give one example) makes a very
persuasive argument that the actors in a system
are more or less constructed by the international
system in which they find themselves, and not
vice versa.
That's a rather theoretical way of putting the
point. There's much more practical way to put
it. Consider East Timor. Why does East Timor
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exist? Or why is it soon to exist? Where did it
come from? East Timor exists and will exist
largely because of things that happened in the
international community, not because of things
that happened inside East Timor or inside
Indonesia.· If it were not for the existence, the
attitudes, the assumptions, the moral
preferences, the ideas and beliefs of people
outside the immediate area, East Timor would
not be in the situation that it currently is. And
East Timor is far from the only example. Until
very recently the Baltic States were not states.
They were provinces of the Soviet Union. What
makes a state start to exist? We can't simply
take the existence of states or the existence of
any other international actors as having some
kind of independent validity outside of the social
system, the legal system, and the political
system that is present in existing international,
non-domestic law.
Rawls is insufficiently critical in adopting
assumptions that states existed before
international society. Doing so ignores the
important role that international law and society
played in creating the states. This is not to say
that the priority should be reversed. The process
is dialectical. States form international law and
society, but international law and society also
form states. The process goes back and forth.
That is how international actors come into
existence. They are not created by God or found
under cabbage leaves.
Any international lawyer would recognize
that not all international actors are states. By
beginning his analysis with statist assumptions
Rawls builds statist structures right into his
philosophical conclusions. Rawls' original
position, from which he constructs his "law of
peoples" is composed only of a group of states,
making their own social contractarian analysis
behind a veil of ignorance. That just is not how
things are. The world is not composed only of
states, or of "peoples," but also of people. There
are non-governmental organizations,
universities, human rights organizations,
churches, mosques and many other institutions
that have just as much independent validity
internationally as states do, from a purely
theoretical point of view. There is no reason
Volume 6(2)
theoretically to start with states as the relevant
actors. Or if there is a reason, Rawls does not
provide it. The detailed attention that
international lawyers have long given to these
questions shows how very far ahead of Rawls
they already are. There would be no point in




"THE USEFULNESS OF WHICH RAWLS?"
Lea Brilmayer invites us to consider the
usefulness of John Rawls' theory of justice for
international law. Her paper is based on Rawls'
essay The Law of Peoples, first published in
1993. Her paper and its conclusion, that there
would be "no point" in applying Rawls' theory
ofjustice to the international arena, reveal much
disappointment in Rawls' efforts as represented
by that essay. Coincidentally, Prof. Brilmayer's
paper was delivered in the same year (1999) in
which Rawls published a book-length treatment
of the same subject, by the same name (The Law
ofPeoples) (hereinafter TLOP). Unfortunately,
there is little in the book that would encourage
Prof. Brilmayer - indeed, the book's argument
follows closely that of the earlier, eponymous
essay. For this reason, I shall treat Prof.
Brilmayer's criticisms as equally applicable to
the book.
I agree with the substance of most of Prof.
Brilmayer's criticisms, as they relate to TLOP.
However, I believe there are good reasons for
considering Rawls' principal work, his theory of
justice as fairness (JAF) developed in A Theory
of Justice (ATOJ), to in fact be quite relevant
and useful to international law; in fact, I would
argue that in TLOP Rawls does not really apply
JAF to the international arena in at all, and that
is its main shortcoming. For this reason, while I
share many of Prof. Brilmayer's criticisms, and
her disappointment, I reach a more optimistic
conclusion as to the promise of Rawls' larger
project for international law.
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